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RECONCILING MEDIA ACCESS WITH
CONFIDENTIALITY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
IN JUVENILE COURT
Susan D. Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
Media access to juvenile court proceedings evokes poten-
tial conflicts among three separate values-the first amend-
ment right of freedom of the press, the tradition of confiden-
tial juvenile court proceedings, and the public's right to know
what goes on in its courts of justice.1 This article will review
the progression of these countervailing values to their present-
day expression in recent cases, most notably the California
Supreme Court's broad holding in Brian W. v. Superior
Court,2 and the United States Supreme Court's reaffirmation
of constitutional guarantees for a free press in Oklahoma Pub-
lishing Co. v. District Court.' Use of a contract to protect
© 1980 by Susan D. Cohen
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1. To date, a minor has no sixth amendment right to a public trial. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) held that the due process clause of the United States Constitution
was applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings, but delineated only those protec-
tions mandated by the Constitution. Gault held that in juvenile proceedings due pro-
cess requires: timely, written notice to the minor and his parents or guardian of the
specific allegations against the minor; the right of the minor and parents or guardian
to be advised of his right to counsel; appointment of counsel if the defendant is una-
ble to afford one; application of the right against self-incrimination; and the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
Since Gault, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a minor in a delin-
quency hearing has the right to have the allegations against him proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), but has no constitutional right
to a trial by jury. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The Court has not
confronted the issue of a right to a public trial in juvenile court.
2. 20 Cal. 3d 618, 574 P.2d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1978), where a minor sought
to exclude media representatives from his fitness hearing in juvenile court. The su-
preme court held that press representatives had a legitimate interest in the hearings
and could be allowed to hear those proceedings.
3. 430 U.S. 308 (1977). The District Court of Oklahoma County enjoined mem-
bers of the press from disseminating the name or picture of a minor, "L.B.," on whom
charges alleging delinquency by second degree murder had been filed. The Oklahoma
405
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juveniles from the public dissemination of their identities will
be proposed as an alternative to the present system, where
proceedings are either totally inaccessible, or open to a lim-
ited public with an accompanying risk that names will be
revealed.
THE JUVENILE COURT MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
Progress toward a judicial system specifically geared to
dealing with, and reforming, youthful offenders, while at the
same time providing them with basic due process protections,
has been slow and erratic at best. Before such a relatively so-
phisticated goal could even be formulated, it was necessary to
gain some measure of public acceptance for the concept that
children who break the law should be treated differently from
adults. The first stage in reformed justice for juveniles thus
took the form of separating them from adult criminals. An
1824 charter for establishing the House of Refuge in New
York City to provide food, shelter, and education to homeless
and destitute children, 4 was one manifestation of this atti-
tude. Juveniles were segregated in a rehabilitative, informal
atmosphere, in an attempt to deter delinquency. The Chicago
Reform School developed a family life approach to the prob-
lem of juvenile corrections that consisted of establishing small
living groups to approximate natural conditions.5 This innova-
tion of the 1850's succeeded in popularizing the use of foster
homes to treat juvenile offenders.'
By 1870, the notion of reform began to spread to the
courts. The Illinois Supreme Court advocated extension of
procedural guarantees to minors, particularly in "grave and
heinous" offenses. 7 These procedures included notice of the
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's order. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 555 P.2d 1286 (1976). The United States Supreme Court reversed on the basis
that the information-the juvenile's name and the allegations against him-was ob-
tained lawfully and that no objection was made to the courtroom presence of the
press, citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 568 (1975): "'Once a
public hearing had been held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior
restraint.' " 430 U.S. at 311.
4. Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, § 4, 1824 N.Y. Laws 111.
5. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1208 (1970).
6. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICERS OF THE CHICAGO REFORM SCHOOL TO
THE BOARD OF GUARDIANS 55 (1859), cited in Fox, supra note 5, at 1209 n.108.
7. People ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 287, 8 Am.R. 645, 651 (1870),
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nature of allegations, and a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury.8 It was also in Illinois that the nation's first juvenile
court law was enacted." Although the 1889 Act emphasized
procedural guarantees, the protections of adult criminal pro-
cedural law were generally rejected. Nevertheless, the notion
of separate courts quickly became popular and all but two
states passed juvenile court laws by 1925.10 Today, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted a system of
juvenile court jurisdiction separate from adult criminal
jurisdiction. 1
The constitutionality of certain aspects of the juvenile
courts was reexamined in 1966, when due process of law was
extended to juvenile court proceedings by the Supreme
Court's In re Gault decision.1 2 For the first time 'the Court
addressed the need for constitutional protections for the mi-
nor where there was a danger of loss of liberty. The Court was
concerned with preserving the hard-won privileges of the juve-
nile court, such as separating juvenile and adult offenders,
avoiding "criminal" classifications, and maintaining confiden-
tiality of proceedings and records. But it took another signifi-
cant step by admitting that, since juvenile "rehabilitation"
may differ little from adult punishment, there was a need for
more basic protections. This attitude was summed up in Jus-
tice Fortas' statement, "[T]he condition of being a boy does
not justify a kangaroo court." 8 However, the Court's Kent v.
United States" holding, that the requirement in juvenile
court of "the essentials of due process and fair treatment,"1 6
cited in Fox, supra note 5, at 1213 n.132.
8. Fox, supra note 5, at 1213 n.132.
9. Act of Apr. 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
10. Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REv.
101, 105 (1958). Wyoming and Maine had no juvenile court legislation. Id. Separate
courts for juveniles proliferated as it became clear that they were constitutional. In
1908, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that:
These questions [the nature of the proceedings, either civil or criminal,
and the purpose of the proceedings, either rehabilitative or punitive]
have all been so extensively, exhaustively and lucidly considered and
discussed by so many courts within recent years that we shall content
ourselves with a citation of some of the authorities ....
In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 126, 96 P. 563, 564 (1908).
11. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 28.
14. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
15. Id. at 562.
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was clarified to exclude the interpretation that a juvenile
hearing must conform to all the requirements of an adult
criminal trial. 16 Thus, in most respects, the traditional
description of the juvenile court ironically remained intact.
Since the decision in Gault, the Court has been asked on
several occasions to specify the requirements of "the essen-
tials of due process and fair treatment." Its response has been
to establish the burden of proof in delinquency cases as "be-
yond a reasonable doubt,' 1 7 to deny a constitutional right to a
trial by jury to juveniles,18 and, to apply the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment to juvenile proceedings." To
date, however, the Court has avoided the major issues of the
right to a public trial20 and the concomitant right of news me-
dia access to juvenile proceedings."'
The fact that juveniles are denied the full spectrum of
rights granted to adult defendants makes it even more impor-
tant that their day in court receives some measure of public
scrutiny. Media representatives are willing to facilitate such
public scrutiny and should be encouraged to do so. Some com-
16. 387 U.S. at 30.
17. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
19. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
20. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-25, which discusses the validity of
maintaining confidentiality of records and notes that other features of "unique bene-
fit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication." Id. at 22.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 555, discusses due process in juvenile
courts, and determines there is no constitutional right to a jury trial.
The availability of trial by jury allows an accused to protect himself
against possible oppression by what is in essence an appeal to the com-
munity conscience, as embodied in the jury that hears his case. To some
extent, however, a similar protection may be obtained when an accused
may in essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing public
attention upon the facts of his trial, exposing improper judicial behavior
to public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress through the
medium of public indignation. Of course, the Constitution, in the con-
text of adult criminal trials, has rejected the notion that public trial is
an adequate substitute for trial by jury in serious cases. But in the con-
text of juvenile delinquency proceedings, I cannot say that it is beyond
the competence of a State to conclude that juveniles who fear that delin-
quency proceedings will mask judicial oppression may obtain adequate
protection by focusing community attention upon the trial of their
cases.
Id. at 554-55 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). It seems that in at least one
Justice's eye, the notion of a public trial is considered among the factors in determin-
ing whether a juvenile hearing has complied with the requirements of due process.
21. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 n.26 (1975).
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promise must be found, however, between affording minors
this protection without stripping them of their right to keep
their individual identities secret.
It is conceivable that confidentiality is the juvenile of-
fender's greatest safeguard, for without it, the minor might as
well be placed squarely in the criminal justice system. With-
out confidentiality the juvenile would suffer many of the disa-
bilities that attach to adult criminals: stigmatization,
prejudice in seeking employment, and difficulties in obtaining
further education. Although originally confidentiality was not
guaranteed,22 it has grown to be a hallmark, and is often the
sole justification for court procedures.2 3 While it has not en-
joyed the status of being a constitutional guarantee, it has
had the support of the United States Supreme Court.2 4
There are basically two types of confidentiality spoken of
in reference to juvenile law: juvenile record sealing or ex-
pungement, and the private nature of the juvenile court pro-
ceedings themselves.2 Frequently, there are statutory provi-
sions regarding the confidentiality and/or sealing of juvenile
records.2 6 Most states have statutes regulating access to juve-
nile proceedings, 7 and while in most jurisdictions the media
22. Fox, supra note 5, 1213.
23. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-31.
24. See id. at 24-25.
25. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 389, 781 (West Supp. 1980)(regarding
record sealing); id. § 346 (regarding the closed nature of the hearings).
26. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-101 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090 (1979);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 389, 781 (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.12(3)
(West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-3501 to 3504 (1976 & Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE §
16-1816 (1979); IND. CODE § 31-6-8-1 to 2 (Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1586
(West 1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1230 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-
1-45 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1125 (West Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-8-33 (1977). But cf. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-19 (1973) (records of first
offenders are made available to state agencies only; subsequent encounters with the
juvenile justice system are made public).
The Standards Relating to Juvenile Records and Information Systems Part XV §
15.1A recommend that juvenile records not be made available to the public. JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, IJA-ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE RECORDS
AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 25 (Tent. draft 1977). Part XVII § 17.1 recommends de-
struction of all unnecessary information contained in the juvenile's record. Id. at 28.
27. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-65 (1977); ALASKA STAT. 47.10.070 (1979); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 45-442 (1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West Supp. 1980); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24A-1801 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1813 (1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-17 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1221 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1-31.B (1978)(public excluded, but media can be present if there is no publica-
tion of the identity of the child or family); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1111 (West
Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-32 (1977)(public hearing unless a pri-
1980]
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may be granted access to hearings, publication of delinquents'
names is prohibited. 8 Unfortunately, although it is often the
case that media reporters are permitted in the courtroom with
the understanding that the juvenile offender's name will not
be publicly disclosed, frequently there is such a subsequent
disclosure. 29 Judges rely on press guidelines 0 and understand-
ings between the judge and reporter, but it was this sort of
reliance, as discussed below, that led to problems in
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court.31
What can amount to grave harm to a juve-
nile-dissemination of information identifying him with delin-
quent behavior-should not be left to the discretion of a juve-
nile court judge or referee, or to a casual understanding
between the judge and the reporter. The purpose of the juve-
nile court is treatment and rehabilitation-publicity is
tantamout to punishment. Whatever deterrent value publica-
tion of a juvenile offender's identity may have, 2 it is grossly
outweighed by the potential harms.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT OF AcCESS
A summary of the scope and nature of the first amend-
vate hearing is requested). But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09 (West Supp. 1979)(hear-
ings are open unless the judge determines closure would best serve the public interest
and the welfare of the child); IND. CODE § 31-6-7-10(b) (1979)(hearings are public, but
may be closed in the discretion of the trial court).
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-65 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-443 (1977); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24A-3503(g) (1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1241 (Supp. 1977);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-31.B (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-34 (1977). Con-
tra, Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-19 (1973)(requires, except for first offenders, the publi-
cation of the identification of the minor and parents "in a newspaper having a general
circulation" in the county of the child's residence).
29. See Comment, The Press and Juvenile Delinquency Hearings: A Contex-
tual Analysis of the Unrefined First Amendment Right of Access, 39 U. PITT. L.
REV. 121, 127 n.31 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 613-17 (1976)(Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
31. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
32. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-19 (1973); statement of the late J. Edgar
Hoover, Chief of the F.B.I., cited in Geis, supra note 10, at 120.
Publicizing of names as well as crimes for public scrutiny, releases, of
past records to appropriate law enforcement officials, and fingerprinting
for future identification are all necessary procedures in the war on
flagrant violators, regardless of age. Local police and citizens have a
right to know the identities of the potential threats to public order
within their communities. (Footnote omitted.)
[Vol. 20
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ment right to freedom of the press is relevant to an under-
standing of how it conflicts with the notion of confidentiality
in the juvenile court. At the outset, it should be noted that
the usual argument leveled against the press-that pretrial
publicity is potentially damaging to the presentation of the
defendant's case-is not at issue in this article. The dissemi-
nation that would identify the minor or his family should be
prohibited for the sake of preserving confidentiality. This
could be accomplished by using the sanction of contempt, al-
though that remedy is generally reserved for instances where
the right to a fair trial is in jeopardy.3s Denying the press any
access to juvenile proceedings ' would have the unfortunate
side effect of closing those proceedings off from public scru-
tiny. Thus, the right of press access to the juvenile court re-
ally hinges on whether there is a right of public access.
Although initial "right of access" cases did not extend
constitutional protections to news gathering,3 ' that activity is
now part of the protected first amendment right." In reality,
this protection may amount to less than it seems. Reporters
can be thwarted when confidential sources realize that disclo-
sure to the press can result in their identification by state or
33. The AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Proposed
Final Draft, Dec. 1967) recommends the limited use of the contempt power against
persons who disseminate information publicly so as to jeopardize a criminal defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, or against a person who knowingly violates a valid judicial
order not to disseminate such information, or information obtained in a closed pre-
trial hearing, or hearings outside the presence of a jury (in a jury trial). For those
jurisdictions which restrict access to juvenile proceedings, the Standards Relating to
Fair Trial and Free Press might be extended to warrant the contempt remedy for
publication of a minor's identification because of the closed nature of the hearings.
Even if the Standards could be stretched far enough to encompass closed juvenile
hearings, they presently provide no protection unless enacted as law.
34. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 n.26 (1975); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
35. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), dealt with the question of whether the
Secretary of State is statutorily authorized to refuse to validate the passports of
United States citizens for travel to Cuba. The appellant argued that the refusal to
validate his passport denied him some right protected by the first amendment to
travel and gather information. The Court held that no such first amendment right to
gather information existed. Id. at 16.
36. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). "Nor is it suggested that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. The
Court determined that although the gathering of news was constitutionally protected,
no constitutional protection exists which would render reporters immune from grand
jury subpoenas requesting disclosure of sources.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
federal authorities. Furthermore, a review of Supreme Court
cases reveals that the first amendment does not guarantee the
press a right of special access to information not generally
available to the public,8 7 nor the unreserved right to keep its
sources secret.
One of the first cases to deal with this issue, Branzburg v.
Hayes88 does not directly address the issue of what constitutes
an infringement on the press' right of access, but may indicate
that courts should balance the state's interest in law enforce-
ment against the burden placed on news functions when the
press is deprived of access or required to reveal its sources.
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for
holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is sufficient to
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering that is said to result from insisting that report-
ers, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put
them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or
criminal trial."9
One commentator suggests the balancing test is the proper
approach;4 0 however, the balancing of the interest in news
gathering and confidentiality of sources against the state's in-
terest in effective law enforcement does not appear to be ab-
solutely required by the Court in subsequent media access
cases.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,'1 Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co.,4' and Pell v. Procunier'" are cases dealing with the right
of media access to prisoners in both state and federal pris-
ons." Although in all instances the Court noted that the poli-
37. Id. at 684; Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Houchins,
Saxbe, and Pell involved the rights of media access to prisons. The Supreme Court
has never intimated a first amendment guarantee of "a right of access to government
information or sources of information within the government's control." 438 U.S. at
15.
38. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
39. Id. at 690-91.
40. Comment, supra note 29, at 129.
41. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
42. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
43. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
44. Houchins involved a question of media access to a county jail. The press
asserted a right of access to government information or sources of information within
the government's control. The Court held that the media had no right of access
[Vol. 20
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cies underlying the prohibition on media access to prisons was
not part of an attempt by authorities to conceal prison condi-
tions,' 5 the Court made no effort to balance the public's right
to know about a particular prisoner's plight against the au-
thorities' right to maintain effective law enforcement. Mem-
bers of the press are entitled to the same access to prisons as
the general public."' Perhaps the Court acknowledged that a
balancing test was raised in Branzburg, for it stated in Saxbe:
In this case, however, it is unnecessary to engage in any
delicate balancing of such penal considerations against
the legitimate demands of the First Amendment .... In
this regard, the Bureau of Prisons [sic] visitation policy
does not place the press in any less advantageous position
than the public generally. '
The news media has traditionally had a right of access to
the courts of this country; the juvenile courts have been the
notable exception. Presently, many juvenile courts admit per-
sons with a legitimate purpose for being there. The press, as a
representative of the public's concerns and as a watchdog of
the judicial process, has a legitimate interest in the juvenile
court system.'8 The news media should be granted access in
greater than that of the public. 438 U.S. at 15. Pell involved the constitutionality of
section '115.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual which provides
that "[plress and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be
permitted." 417 U.S. at 819. Saxbe addressed the constitutionality of paragraph 4b(6)
of Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The court noted the
language of the paragraph as follows:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual in-
mates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an
interview. However, conversation may be permitted with inmates whose
identity is not to be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of
institutional facilities, programs and activities.
417 U.S. at 844 n.1.
45. 438 U.S. at 13-15; 417 U.S. at 848; 417 U.S. at 830.
46. 417 U.S. at 849; 417 U.S. at 830-31. The standards of access in the Califor-
nia and federal prisons may differ somewhat, but they are basically similar. The Cali-
fornia prisons permit public access by means of tours conducted by the Department
of Corrections. The general rule in federal prisons is that no one may enter a prison
and designate a prisoner whom (s)he would like to visit, unless the prospective visitor
is a lawyer, clergyman, relative, or a friend of the particular inmate.
47. 417 U.S. at 849.
48. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1975).
The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry
with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the
protected rights responsibly-a duty widely acknowledged but not al-
ways observed by editors and publishers.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the same manner as any member of the public would be
granted access to fulfill some legitimate concern or purpose.4 9
It is important to distinguish this legitimate inter-
est-knowledge of the process-from the juvenile defendant's
interest in nondisclosure of his identity.50
Freedom to Publish
Prior restraint on speech and publication is a serious and
highly disfavored infringement on first amendment rights.
While the possibility of criminal or civil liability after publica-
tion, for example in cases of defamation, may somewhat im-
pede publication, a prior restraint prohibits publication alto-
gether. A prior restraint, therefore, is viewed by the courts
with a "heavy presumption" against its constitutional valid-
ity.51 As Justice Brennan stated in Nebraska Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart," the system of prior restraints "'allows less
opportunity for public appraisal and criticism.'
Injunctions restraining the news media from publishing
lawfully obtained information are generally disfavored. Yet,
two categories of exceptions remain: 1) where a criminal de-
fendant's right to a fair trial may be impaired although all
possible safeguards have been exhausted;5 4 and, 2) when the
nation's security is at stake."
Id. at 560.
49. This assumes a statutory provision or practice whereby persons not directly
involved in the juvenile proceedings are admitted to the proceedings. A means to
protect a minor's identity should be used to enable the news media to observe the
judicial proceedings and perform its watchdog function without risking disclosure of
the minor's identification.
50. Support exists for the public's right to a public (adult) trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 1949); Davis v. United States, 247
F. 394, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1917); Kiritowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745,
300 P.2d 103 (1956).
51. Historically, there has been a presumption against the constitutionality of
prior restraints on the press. Three exceptions developed during the twentieth cen-
tury. Prior restraints might be constitutional where: 1) the speech might have an ad-
verse effect on the conduct of war, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); 2)
the speech might incite a riot or advocate the violent overthrow of the government,
amounting to a breach of the peace, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); and 3) the speech amounts to an "obscene" publication, Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
52. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
53. Id. at 589-90 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
506 (1970)).
54. Id. at 569-70.
55. Id. at 590-91 (Brennani, J., concurring).
[Vol. 20
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The first category of exceptions noted above has bearing
on the issue of providing confidential proceedings for minors.
Cases in that area indicate that the Supreme Court's attitude
toward press access hinges on whether or not there has been
public access to the courtroom. For example, in Nebraska
Press Association, the Court reversed a Nebraska court's re-
straint on damaging pretrial publicity in a mass-murder
case2 6 Following a detailed balancing of the harms,57 the
Court noted that there was nothing prohibiting the press from
reporting events that transpired at a public court
proceeding."8
The public access justification for press coverage was ex-
tended to a situation involving a juvenile in Oklahoma Pub-
lishing Co. v. District Court.9 In 1976, an eleven-year-old
boy, "L.B.," was charged by the juvenile authorities of the
State of Oklahoma with delinquency by second degree mur-
der. The minor was arraigned at a "closed" hearing at which
the judge entered a pretrial order enjoining members of the
news media from "publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating,
in any manner, the name or picture of [the] minor child." 0
56. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975). Simants was ar-
rested and arraigned for the murders of six members of a family found murdered in
their home. The mass killings in the small rural community of Sutherland, Nebraska,
attracted widespread news coverage both locally and nationally. The Nebraska court
feared that publicity surrounding the crime jeopardized the defendant's right to be
tried by an impartial jury, and upheld (but modified) the lower court's restraining
order. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska court's ruling on the
ground that the criminal defendant, Simants, had not met the heavy burden imposed
to secure a prior restraint. 427 U.S. at 543-44.
57. The Court used a balancing test to determine the legality of the pretrial
restraining order: whether " 'the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger,' " Id. at 562,
(quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 494,
562 (1951)).
The Court noted pretrial publicity does not necessarily lead to an unfair trial,
and within legal confines, the judge must take precautions to mitigate the effects of
pretrial publicity. 427 U.S. at 554-55. The Court suggested the three-prong guidelines
set forth in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966): the judge should con-
tinue the case until the threat of prejudice abates, transfer the case to a county in
which the pretrial publicity has not been prejudicial, or sequester the jury. Where the
matter at issue is the impaneling of dn impartial jury, sequestration is not a viable
means of ensuring a defendant's constitutional rights. 427 U.S. at 562.
58. Id. at 568.
59. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
60. Id. It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court published
the minor's full name. Although in this particular case the issue may be moot, publi-
cation of the minor's full name or last name only does not further the confidential
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Oklahoma law provided that a juvenile "hearing shall be pri-
vate unless specifically ordered by the judge to be conducted
in public, but persons having a direct interest in the case shall
be admitted."6 '
The United States Supreme Court did not address the
constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute, but rather, relied
upon Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn62 and held that, as the
hearing had in fact been open to the public, the state court
could not restrain publication of events occurring at such a
hearing.6
The distinction between a public or private hearing was
compelled as a result of decisions in Cox, Houchins, Pell, and
Saxbe.6 Cox held that no sanctions could be imposed for the
publication of the name of a rape victim that had been re-
vealed in connection with the prosecution of a crime. As long
as the public had access to such proceedings, the media could
not be excluded or restrained from disseminating information
obtained:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial
proceedings, the States must respond by means which
avoid public documentation or other exposure of private
information .... Once true information is disclosed in
public court documents open to public inspection, the
press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.6"
Because the Court specifically refrained from addressing
the constitutionality of laws limiting access to hearings and
records in juvenile proceedings,66 such access, and precisely
what is needed to ensure that a hearing is kept private, re-
main open questions. For example, if a judge admits one per-
son into the juvenile courtroom for research purposes, is that
proceeding then tantamount to a public hearing? Can a media
representative ever be admitted into the courtroom and the
proceeding still be considered private? Or does any access, al-
though limited and discretionary, necessarily open the court-
nature of juvenile court proceedings.
61. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1111 (West Supp. 1979).
62. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
63. 430 U.S. at 310.
64. The significance of PeU and Saxbe to the public/private distinction is that if
the hearing is private there is no media access, hence no issue of publication.
65. 420 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 496 n.26.
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room to the public?
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 67 the Court finally
addressed the constitutionality of a state criminal statute that
made it a crime for a newspaper to publish the name of a mi-
nor charged as a juvenile offender unless there was prior ap-
proval by the juvenile court. The relevant statute prohibited
publication of the "name of any child, in connection with any
proceedings under [the Child Welfare Chapter] . . . without
written order of the court."' Two newspapers obtained the
name of a juvenile, allegedly responsible for a shooting, from a
police band radio and on-the-scene reporters. The initial
newspaper account of the incident did not include the name
of the suspected juvenile, but subsequent articles did. Shortly
thereafter, a grand jury returned an indictment against the
newspapers.
The Court's main concern was not with prior restraint,
but rather the ability of the state to punish the offending
newspaper after it had published the juvenile's name. Relying
on the constitutional standards established in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginiae the Court in Smith found
the criminal sanctions to be unconstitutional.70
Smith suggests a test whereby publication of truthful in-
formation that has been lawfully obtained may not be pun-
ished unless the state can show an interest of the "highest or-
der."" Applying that test, the Court concluded that the
state's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offend-
ers was not sufficient to justify criminal sanctions. Further-
more, the Court indicated a lack of evidence demonstrating
that criminal sanctions were necessary to fulfill the state's in-
terest in maintaining confidentiality in juvenile court
67. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
68. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976).
69. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
70. 443 U.S. at 104-06. Landmark Communications rejected a "clear and pre-
sent danger" test for determining the constitutional validity of criminal sanctions im-
posed for the publication of information obtained at confidential Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission hearings. The Court balanced the state's interests in preserving
the confidentiality of Commission proceedings by the use of criminal sanctions
against first amendment guarantees, and determined that the state's interests were
insufficient to warrant the imposition of criminal sanctions. 435 U.S. at 841. The
Court was not concerned with the issues of criminal sanctions for the publication of
information unlawfully obtained or of Virginia's power to preserve confidentiality in
its Commission hearings. Id. at 837.
71. 443 U.S. at 103-04.
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proceedings.
The limited holding in Smith did not address the issue of
unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings."'
The name of the juvenile offender was lawfully obtained from
a public source and the statute imposed criminal sanctions.
The case should therefore be read narrowly. If access to confi-
dential juvenile court proceedings is limited so as to exclude
entry with the purpose or intent to disseminate juveniles'
names, then some civil sanction might be imposed where the
privilege of access is obtained fraudulently.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY
Although a juvenile has no constitutional right to a public
trial,73 the lack of such a right does not diminish the impor-
tance of public scrutiny in maintaining ethical and prudent
judicial proceedings. The notion of a public trial has an im-
portant place in the history of this country. The Penn-
sylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights,7 and the North
Carolina Constitution, Declaration of Rights, 5 were the first
instruments in this country to guarantee the right to a public
trial.
In 1791, the sixth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution was ratified, ensuring that "[imn all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . . .' In.1948, the United States Supreme Court was
"unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted
in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the
history of this country. '' 7 Secret trials, of course, are part of
the history of suppression of divergent political and religious
beliefs, most notably during the Spanish Inquisitions in the
practices of the English Court of Star Chamber 7 9 and the
72. Id. at 105.
73. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
74. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX (current version at PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9).
75. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. IX (current version at N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 23).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15, also ensures a criminal
defendant the right to a speedy and public trial.
77. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948)(footnote omitted).
78. See A.L. MAYCOCK, THE INQUISITION FROM ITS ESTABLISHMENT TO THE GREAT
SCHISM 145-64 (1927).
79. See Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 381, 386-89
(1931-1932).
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French lettre de cachet.8 0 The right to a public trial is a guar-
antee that the courts of justice will not be used to persecute,
with public awareness and opinion serving as the effective
check. A second, equally important consideration in guaran-
teeing a public trial for criminal cases is the right of a crimi-
nal defendant to have his case heard before the people.8 1
Public Scrutiny of Juvenile Courts in California
In California, juvenile court proceedings are not consid-
ered criminal in nature and, therefore, have been exempted
from the constitutional requirement of a public trial for crim-
inal cases.8 2 When juvenile proceedings are not a matter of
public record, the public has no corresponding right to know
the identity of the minor accused of the delinquent act. In
order to preserve confidentiality, the court must have discre-
tion to exclude observers from the courtroom.
The justifiable aim of protecting a minor's identity, how-
ever, should not override the equally desirable goal of encour-
aging responsible reporting of the process of juvenile court
proceedings. California's solution to this dilemma is to at-
tempt a compromise between confidentiality for the juvenile
and public scrutiny over the courts by permitting a limited
amount of public review. The California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 676 provides:
Unless requested by the minor concerning whom the
petition has been filed and any parent or guardian pre-
sent, the public shall not be admitted to a juvenile court
hearing. The judge or referee may nevertheless admit
such persons as he deems to have a direct and legitimate
interest in the particular case or the work of the court. 8
The California Supreme Court recently interpreted the
intent of the foregoing statute in addressing the issue of me-
dia access to juvenile fitness hearings. In Brian W. v. Superior
Court,4 decided in February 1978, the court concluded that
80. The lettre de cachet was an order of the King of France that one of his
subjects be imprisoned or exiled without a trial or an opportunity to defend himself.
Id. at 388.
81. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
82. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West Supp. 1980).
84. 20 Cal.3d 618, 574 P.2d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1978).
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in vesting the judge with discretion to admit to juvenile
court proceedings persons having a "direct and legitimate
interest in the particular case or work of the court," it
was the purpose of the Legislature to allow press attend-
ance at juvenile hearings.8 5
Brian W. was a seventeen-year-old charged with murder and
kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. Under California Wel-
fare and Institutions Code section 707(b)," the district attor-
ney sought a fitness hearing in order to have the minor bound
over to adult court. The minor moved for a closed hearing and
an order preventing court officers and witnesses from commu-
nicating with the press.87
The trial court ordered a closed hearing but permitted
media representatives to attend the proceedings on the condi-
tion that the names of the minor and his parents not be dis-
closed. The petitioner challenged the ruling on the basis that
press attendance was inconsistent with the confidential nature
of the juvenile court as expressed in the California Welfare
and Institutions Code, providing for a closed hearing.8 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Mosk stated that press attend-
ance at juvenile court proceedings would not frustrate the re-
habilitative purpose of the juvenile court because the judge's
exercise of control over any disclosure of the juvenile's iden-
tity would preserve confidentiality.8 9
Although Brian W. permitted media access to juvenile
court proceedings, there is every indication that the supreme
court's intention was to keep the proceedings private.90 In
fact, although there is no reason that media access and confi-
dentiality for the juvenile need conflict, some additional pro-
tection is required to ensure that once a member of the public
85. Id. at 623, 574 P.2d at 791, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
86. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (Deering 1979) (current version at §
707(b)(West Supp. 1980)) provided in relevant part:
In any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in Sec-
tion 602 by reason of the violation, when he was 16 years of age or older,
of one of the following offenses:
(1) Murder; ...
(6) Kidnapping for purpose of robbery; . . [the court shall upon mo-
tion of the petitioner] . . . find that the minor is not a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law ....
87. 20 Cal. 3d at 620-21, 574 P.2d at 789, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West Supp. 1980).
89. 20 Cal. 3d at 623, 574 P.2d at 791, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
90. Id. at 622, 574 P.2d at 790, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
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is allowed into the courtroom, the minor's name is not allowed
to be released.
Proposed-A Contract to Allow Public Scrutiny and Preserve
Confidentiality
One solution to the media access/confidentiality dilemma
may be found in the law of contract-that is, the law could
require a contract between the judge or the court and indi-
vidual observers, be they members of the news media or the
general public. Such a contract would apply in courtrooms to
which the general public has a limited right of access, for ex-
ample, the juvenile courts of California. A model contract
might provide:
I - -. understand that juvenile court proceedings
are generally closed to the public and that there is no
public right to know of the events that occur in juvenile
court proceedings. The law of this state provides that thejudge or referee may admit persons as (s)he deems to
have a direct and legitimate interest in the particular
case or the work of the court.
The judge or referee, in his/her discretion, has deter-
mined that dissemination of the identities of minors and
their families, or any witness called before this court (in-
cluding names, photographs, addresses, and other identi-
fying information) is not a lawful purpose for which ac-
cess to this court is being granted. Entrance to this court
with the purpose or intent of disseminating the identities
of the parties constitutes a fraud on the court.
The judge or referee understands that in permitting
_ _ to observe this proceeding, the facts other than iden-
tities of the persons present may be made public.
I understand that I am being granted a privilege to
observe this court function, and that this privilege may be
lost if I breach any of the conditions of my entry:
1. Identities of the parties and witnesses before the
court, and their families, shall not be disseminated pub-
licly, including names, photographs, addresses, and other
identifying information.
2. I will at all times maintain proper courtroom conduct
and obey directions of the judge, referee, bailiff, or clerk.
In the event this contract is breached and harm re-
sults, the injured party is entitled to bring an action for
damages. For purposes of relief, injured parties may in-
clude parties before the court, witnesses, and the families
19801
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of both witnesses and parties. No legal relief is created for
pain and suffering or loss of reputation in the community.
The statute of limitations shall run until five (5)
years after the minor has reached the age of majority, or
eight (8) years after the damaging publication, whichever
is longer.
The terms of this contract shall be made applicable
each time I enter this court during the period __ -
Signature of Observer Signature of Judge (or
Referee, Clerk, etc.)
Date Date
The benefits of such a contract are best understood with
an illustration. Assume that a delinquency petition is sus-
tained on a sixteen-year-old. When he turns eighteen, his
records are sealed. Subsequent to having his records sealed,
the individual seeks employment and is asked by a prospec-
tive employer, "Have you ever been convicted of a crime?"
Answering "no," the individual is hired. If the minor's iden-
tity was made public at the time his petition was sustained,
however, and the prospective employer knows of the delin-
quent behavior and refuses to hire the individual on the basis
of that behavior, the record sealing is of no effect; publication
of identity clearly contravenes the intent of statutory and case
law provisions for record sealing. The contract discussed
above would provide a potential remedy.
It must be pointed out that it is highly unlikely that any
state could contract with private individuals in a way that
amounted to contracting away a constitutional right."' In our
context, if the public had a right to know of the events in a
juvenile hearing, the proposed contract would be an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint. But no such right of access exists re-
91. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), in which the
government, in its capacity as an employer, entered into a "Secrecy Agreement" with
an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. Upon that employee's termination of
service with the Central Intelligence Agency, a "Secrecy Oath" was entered into by
Mr. Marchetti and the government. Both the Agreement and the Oath prohibited the
disclosure of information relating to national defense and security. Id. at 1312. The
court determined that while Marchetti might be constitutionally restrained from di-
vulging classified information, the Secrecy Oath which purported to prevent disclo-
sure of both classified and unclassified information could not be enforced. Id. at 1315.
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garding "closed" juvenile proceedings. A judge may exclude
all observers from juvenile hearings, and thereby preclude the
dissemination of any information relating to those proceed-
ings. Under California's limited access statute, when observ-
ers, including the media, are allowed into the courtroom, the
judge does not say, "This is now a public hearing." Rather,
the judge is permitting the presence of individuals who will
satisfy some "legitimate or direct" concern; publication of
identities is not a legitimate concern.92 It is also important to
note that the restraint envisioned here is de minimis. The
only information walled off from widespread public disclosure
is the identities of persons involved in the court action.
A contract such as the one proposed above would provide
a valuable tool for protecting a juvenile offender's identity, yet
ease the access to juvenile hearings for the purposes of re-
search and study. The hazards inherent in any unwritten un-
derstanding regarding the confidential nature of the proceed-
ings between a judge and a news representative or private
individual are avoided. Moreover, the contract would provide
not only a legal prohibition against the dissemination of iden-
tities, but also a cause of action for damages arising out of any
unlawful disclosure. Finally, no "gray area" remains regard-
ing what information may or may not be disseminated. No in-
formation that would identify any of the individuals involved
in the litigation could be disseminated.
CONCLUSION
The problem of confidentiality of juvenile court proceed-
ings requires some immediate attention. Oklahoma Publish-
ing Co. has brought to light the issue of the strength of an
agreement between a judge and a reporter in maintaining the
confidentiality of a delinquent's identity. The California Su-
preme Court, without adequately dealing with the ramifica-
tions of Oklahoma Publishing Co., permitted media access to
the fitness portion of juvenile hearings, supposedly leaving the
confidentiality intact, "as the judge can exercise control over
disclosure of the juvenile's identity."9 It was recognized in
92. For example, if an individual requested admission to a juvenile court for the
purpose of publishing a list of juvenile offenders, the request could, and should, be
denied.
93. Brian W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 623, 574 P.2d at 791, 143 Cal.
1980]
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Brian W. that the Oklahoma juvenile court's hearings were, in
fact, held to be open,94 but the California court failed to note
that Oklahoma law provided for closed juvenile hearings.95
There is nothing in the law to prevent a determination that
the presence of a newsperson or a private individual at a juve-
nile court hearing makes that hearing in fact public, prevent-
ing a judge from exercising control over the disclosure of
juveniles' identities. In the interest of maintaining confidenti-
ality in juvenile courts while upholding the integrity of the
judicial process through public monitoring, a legally binding
alternative, such as the contract proposed herein, should be
adopted.
Rptr. at 720 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 626 n.6, 574 P.2d at 791 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. 720 n.6.
95. See text accompanying note 61, supra.
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